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Preface 
This paper was delivered on World Population Day, Ju~y 
11, 1991 to the United Nations Association of Australw 
in Canberra. At the time of writing, Valerie Hull was a 
visitor with the Child Survival Project of the ANU. 
Population and development: macro-level 
Issues 
Most descriptions of the macro-level issues of 
population and development inevitably begin with the 
litany of statistics about population growth. There can 
be at least two problems with this. First, it gives the 
impression that it is numbers, not people, that are 
important. Second, there is a danger that overexposure 
to these numbers can make them lose the impact they 
should have. 
Even though most of us might be more comfortable 
discussing non-quantitative issues of population, we 
need to come to grips with the actual magnitude of 
population growth and population momentum in order to 
understand the nature of the challenges posed by 
unprecedented expansion of human numbers. 
The rate of population growth of the world actually 
slowed somewhat in the latter half of the 1980s but, 
given the huge population base, in absolute numbers we 
will be adding more people every day in the 1990s than 
ever before. A quarter of a million people are added to 
world population every day - between 90 and 100 
million people a year. In numerical terms, this is almost 
equivalent to adding another Nigeria or Bangladesh each 
year. 
Figure 1 : Numbers Added to World Population Each 
Decade, 1750 to 2010 
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If you can remember only one key figure about 
population growth, remember 250,000 people a day or 
100 million additional people a year. In a discussion on 
dimensions of population and development, that is one 
dimension in the quantitative sense which all people 
need to grasp. 
By way of comparison, in the 1950s, when people w~re 
just beginning to talk about the so-called population 
explosion, we were adding 50 million pe~ple ~ y~ar. 
Never in history has the world had to cope with this kmd 
of increase. 
The rate of growth is the second statistic which is helpful 
in understanding population growth. When we hear that 
a country is growing at a rate of, say, 2 per cent a year, 
it doesn't sound like much unless you understand the 
effect of compounding. This figure of 2 per cent a year 
means a doubling of population in only 35 years. 
The useful rule of thumb to find doubling time is to 
divide the annual percentage growth rate into 70 
(technically 69.4). For example, a continuing rate of 2.77 
percent per year means a doubling in 25 years - a single 
generation. Countries with current growth rates above 
2.77 percent are listed in Figure 2. 
Doubling of population every generation would of 
course provide incredible challenges for those 
responsible to plan and invest for health services, 
schools, and eventually jobs. Yet rates in excess of 3 
percent are still found in parts of the developing worl.d -
particularly in Africa and the Middle East. In our region 
such rates are found in the Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu. 
Conversely, in East Asia the average growth rate is 1.3 
per cent per annum, implying a longer doubling ti~e of 
around 54 years if this growth rate were to contmue. 
These rates are taken from the revised UN figures which 
were published in 1991. 
Growth rates alone are not the whole story, since growth 
is composed of both natural increase - the balance 
between births and deaths - and net migration in or out 
of a nation. For instance, according to the UN, the 
growth rates of China and Australia are nearly identical, 
at 1.5 and 1.4 per cent per annum. However China has 
an unusually low rate for a developing country due to its 
very strict fertility control policies, while substantial in-
migration in Australia has resulted in an unusually high 
growth rate for a developed country. 
Figure 2 
Countries with Growth Rates Set to Double Population in Less than 25 Years (ie growth of over 2.8 
per cent per annum) 
Bahrain- 3.7 
Benin- 3.0 
Botswana- 3.7 
Brunei- 3.4 
Burundi - 2.9 
Cameroon - 3.3 
Cayman Islands - 3.9 
Central African Rep. - 2.8 
Comoros - 3.5 
Congo- 3.2 
Djibouti - 2.9 
French Guiana - 3.4 
French Polynesia- 3.2 
Gabon- 3.5 
Gambia- 2.9 
Ghana- 3.2 
Guatemala - 2.9 
Guinea- 2.9 
Honduras - 3.2 
Iran - 3.5 
Iraq- 3.5 
Ivory Coast- 3.8 
Jordan- 3.3 
Kenya- 3.6 
Kuwait- 3.4 
Laos- 2.8 
Lesotho - 2.9 
Liberia- 3.2 
Libya- 3.7 
Madagascar- 3.2 
Macau -4.0 
Malawi- 3.5 
Mali- 3.0 
Maldives- 3.2 
Namibia - 3.2 
Nicaragua - 3.4 
Niger- 3.1 
Nigeria - 3.3 
Oman- 3.8 
Pakistan- 3.4 
Paraguay - 2.9 
Qatar- 4.2 
The important thing about these figures on population 
growth is what they mean for people and the quality of 
life. 
The challenges rapid population growth pose for 
education are well-known, but many do not realize the 
difference the rate of population growth can make. 
Figure 3 shows the relative sizes of the school-aged 
population in a number of countries, comparing the 
numbers in 1950 and the end of the century. A country 
such as Kenya, growing at 3.6 per cent a year, faces a 
school age population at the turn of the century which is 
7 times larger than it was in 1950. In Colombia the 
number of school-age children doubled between 1950 
and 1970 but then began to stabilize marlcedly as fertility 
declined. In Korea and more dramatically in China, 
declining fertility has meant much slower growth and 
even reduction of the numbers of school age children. 
Rwanda- 3.4 
St Helena- 3.3 
Saudi Arabia- 4.0 
Senegal - 2.8 
Solomon Islands - 3.3 
Somalia - 3.3 
Sudan- 2.9 
Swaziland - 3.4 
Syria- 3.6 
Tanzania- 3.7 
Togo- 3.1 
Uganda- 3.7 
United Arab Emirates - 3.3 
Vanuatu- 3.0 
Wallis and Futuna- 4.5 
Yemen, North- 3.1 
Yemen, South- 3.8 
Zaire- 3.1 
Zambia- 3.8 
Zimbabwe - 3.2 
Figure 3: Growth lndlcles of the School Age 
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We have seen in recent decades that even though 
tremendous investments have been made in education 
and other development efforts in the Third World, these 
investments are diluted by rapid population growth. 
Despite increased rates of enrollment, the absolute 
numbers of children not in school continue to rise. It is 
estimated they will reach 315 million by the tum of the 
century. The race to provide services such as education 
to rapidly growing populations has been compared to 
running up the down escalator. You have to run very 
fast to maintain upward motion. 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Year 
~; World Bank Development Report, 1984, p. 84. 
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Slowing down the escalator - or slowing population 
growth - does not imply that you can stop running. 
Rather it means that your investments in social 
improvements will be translated more directly into 
upward progress. Slowing population growth alone 
obviously does not automatically mean improvements in 
education. Many developing countries are characterized 
by skewed government spending between sectors, with 
high proportions of GNP going to military expenditure 
and large debt burdens. Regressive policies in education 
which favour higher over lower levels of schooling, and 
the low status of women in many societies, restrict 
women's access to education. There are sometimes 
inappropriate curricula and poor quality of teaching. 
These are all issues which need to be addressed through 
more progressive policy efforts to ensure that nations 
run as hard as they can up the escalator. No matter how 
well or poorly the government sets education and other 
welfare priorities, rapid population growth presents a 
fundamental challenge which makes development much 
more difficult. It means extending available resources 
ever more thinly to meet the basic demands of the 
growing population. It also means a smaller proportion 
of the investment is available for improving the quality 
of that education. 
This seems like common sense, so what makes the topic 
of population sometimes controversial? There is always 
a danger that the population issue is reduced to a single 
goal of controlling numbers which becomes virtually an 
end in itself, rather than a means to an end. And this is 
more than just a conceptual issue - it can lead to a 
narrow and authoritarian approach to framing and 
implementing population policy. 
Critics from both the Right and Left of the political 
spectrum are unhappy with the narrow 'demographic 
determinist' viewpoint. This is apparent today in much 
of the debate on environmental issues, where some are 
loathe to highlight population growth for fear of 
'blaming the victim' and drawing attention away from 
other causes of environment problems, particularly the 
wasteful consumption patterns among the affluent 
Over-consumption by the few is posed as an alternative 
to the notion of a "population problem". 
Framing the debate in such confrontational terms is 
unfortunate, for by criticising the narrow demographic 
determinists, we might be said to be throwing out the 
'baby boom' with the bathwater, ignoring the important 
challenges of population growth. As the UNFP A has 
noted: for any given type of technology, for any given 
level of consumption or waste, for any given level of 
poverty or inequality, the more people there are, the 
greater is the impact on the environment Ignoring the 
impact of the growth of human populations can also 
imply an unreflective acceptance of the primacy of the 
'rights' of human proliferation over all other ecological, 
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spiritual and material values held by human beings and 
evident in the beauty and variety of the earth. 
If we are concerned with avoiding simplistic 
demographic determinism, what would an enlightened 
population development policy look like? 
-Overall, it would be based on a recognition of the two-
way relation between population and development. Not 
only do development programs need to consider 
population factors, but equally, population programs 
cannot succeed without efforts to raise the quality of life 
and equitably distribute the gains of development. 
-There need to be explicit links between national 
economic goals and individual welfare goals, with 
particular attention to women's roles. This implies more 
attention to the quality of family planning and health 
services. 
-Population policies would be grounded in sound 
analysis of the current and projected situations based on 
good quality data. 
-It would involve not a single-minded preoccupation 
with population growth, but other aspects of population 
dynamics, including policies on population distribution, 
urbanization, the control of mortality, responses to 
changing population age structure and population-
environment interactions. 
-It would involve coordination among the different 
sectors of the economy and the society. 
-Finally, there would be constant, open international 
dialogue on the issues, so countries could learn from 
each other's experiences. 
As with economic policies of structural adjustment, a 
balanced population policy, or in other words a policy of 
'demographic adjustment', needs to present a human 
face. 
To lose sight of human welfare in promoting population 
control is self-defeating in terms of ultimate 
development goals. Increasingly it is being shown that 
policies and programs which do aim at quality services 
and which keep individual welfare goals in the forefront, 
are likely to achieve more sustainable demographic 
change favouring further development. 
Is this an unrealistic wish list? The policy goal of 
integrating population with other development efforts 
has been around for a long time, but is being 
implemented in many different settings. Forty-five 
countries already have population policy units within 
their national planning ministries. It is interesting that 
within the UN system, the UNFP A is organizationally 
integrated in its country programs, being responsible to 
the UNDP, unlike other specialized UN agencies which 
tend to run more autonomous programs, with all the 
problems of competition and overlap which that 
sometimes implies. 
Many other facets of 'the ideal population and 
development policy' are being pursued in various 
nations. We cannot deny, however, that probably no 
country has achieved a perfect program in population, 
any more than there is perfection in any other facet of 
development as these are very challenging areas. 
In the current financial climate, implementing an 
enlightened population and development policy is a 
large order. This is one reason behind the calls to 
increase population aid. Just to meet existing demand 
for family planning services, for example, has proved 
elusive. Because of the projected huge increases in 
reproductive-age population, as well as increased 
demand for contraceptives, there will be growing 
demands in this one area alone, even without 
improvements in quality. It is sometimes regarded as 
cheaper to implement a narrowly-based authoritarian 
approach to population than the kind of 'human' policy 
just described. 
International assistance helps to bolster areas which are 
often neglected: training and technical assistance in 
policy development and good demographic data 
collection and analysis. Also needed are social and 
operational research; assistance in service delivery 
programs (including management needs); training more 
women for policy and management roles; and, of course, 
population education. Research on contraceptive 
technology is still inadequate. More than half the 
countries in the world still lack reliable statistics on 
births and deaths. These are all areas where the 
international community is playing a role which could be 
expanded. International dialogue is essential to 
developing and maintaining the political will necessary 
to make this happen through collaboration. 
Population and development: micro-level 
Issues 
Sound population and development strategies based on 
concern for quality services delivered in accord with 
principles of voluntarism have the potential to benefit a 
group which has traditionally been disadvantaged -
Third World women. These strategies will only do so if 
governments understand this perspective and adopt a 
sensitive approach to the needs of women. This is true in 
both a general and more direct sense. 
Generally, as countries are better able to free themselves 
from the frantic 'run up the down escalator', basic 
education, health and other services can become more 
widely accessible. As research has shown, this 
reinforces the trend toward lower fertility. Women who 
have had access to education, who feel more assured that 
their children will survive, and who have opportunities 
for social recognition beyond childbearing are most 
likely to limit their family size. New economic 
structures give them new options; new educational 
systems give them new preferences; and rising incomes 
and better facilities give them safe, new means of 
fertility control. These effects of economic and social 
development is shown to be true in rich countries. 
More particularly, the object of development is to 
produce institutions which can address pressing human 
needs for health, productivity and knowledge. Control 
over reproduction is both an obvious means to better 
health and the common result of falling mortality rates. 
Figure 4. Infant Mortality by Maternal Age, 
Peru 
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Figure 5. Infant Mortality by Parity, 
Peru 
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Figure 6. Maternal Mortality by Age, 
Matlab, Bangladesh 
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Figure 7. Maternal Mortality by Birth Order, 
Matlab, Bangladesh 
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The health and survival of mothers and children is 
facilitated by access to family planning services and 
advice. For instance, surveys around the developing 
world have repeatedly shown that early, rapid and late 
childbearing increases the mortality rates of both women 
and their babies. Figures 4 through 7 present data for 
Peru and Bangladesh, but the patterns are typical of the 
Third World Maternal mortality in particular is 
elevated for teen-agers and women who become 
pregnant in their forties. Many, though obviously not 
all, of the maternal and infant deaths in the Third World 
can be prevented through the promotion of later 
marriage, birth spacing and prevention of high parity 
births. Many more deaths can be prevented if countries 
give higher priority to the provision of accessible health 
services to people of all classes. 
Development policies and programs can have an 
important impact on the formation of family size 
preferences. But even where development is slow or 
non-existent, people's view of the world and their place 
in it is changing rapidly. In the villages of Asia we have 
been astounded at the rapid pace of social change - with 
revolutions in personal and social values of a magnitude 
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far outstripping the rates of growth of GNP per capita. 
These changes are bringing about a total reevaluation of 
the costs, benefits and value of childbearing. 
A few examples may demonstrate the importance of 
these changes. 
In a remote village in Shaanxi province families decided 
in 1988 that they should act collectively to prevent 
adolescent children from leaving school to work infields 
or a village based brickworks. Education, they 
reasoned, would be the key to future welfare of the 
whole village. Moreover, the rules would apply equally 
to boys and girls. Virtually all the parents taking this 
decision had themselves received less than 6th class 
education. 
Throughout Java the age at marriage is rising. In 
previous generations marriages were commonly 
a"anged by parents soon after their daughters reached 
puberty. Today, communities regard this as 'outdated' 
(kuno) behaviour, and most marriages are 'love' matches 
between men and women in their late teens and early 
twenties. The new patterns have produced much lower 
rates of divorce, and young couples say that decisions 
about childbearing should depend on their joint 
consideration, free from the influence of relatives. This 
new pattern is accompanied by rising proportions of 
young women participating in higher education and the 
forma/labour force. 
Villagers in Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Thailand and China, who are subject to incredibly 
different ideologies, religions and economies, are 
increasingly forthright in declaring a preference for two 
or three children. They say they want to provide more 
opportunities for their children than they had 
themselves. Growing commitment to education is most 
impressive, because it reflects their belief that schooling 
will help prepare their children for a world which is 
obviously changing rapidly. This change in outlook is 
occurring even in settings where farmers sweat behind 
bullocks to plough fields, and rely on very labour 
intensive forms of trade and manufacture. These are 
parents with a dream for the future of themselves and 
their children - a dream that has no history in their 
culture. 
Thus, there is thus a strong case to be made that birth 
planning at the micro-level is a benefit to the health of 
both women and children, a key to improving the status 
and economic options for women, and is also 
increasingly demanded by people throughout the 
developing world who are caught up in a rapid change of 
expectations and familial values. 
Critics of population control programs frequently refer 
to what is perhaps the most often cited study of 
population and development, produced by the US 
National Research Council (Population Growth and 
Economic Developement: Policy Questions), and 
heavily oriented toward macroeconomic considerations. 
This report is taken as providing 'negative' proof that 
data on economic growth do not show a clear benefit 
from lower rates of population growth. However, in the 
concluding chapter, after reviewing evidence on the 
links between population growth and various forms of 
economic and social development, the authors say: 
There is little debate about the desirability of 
programs that allow couples access to easy, 
affordable, and effective means of family 
planning, even among those who see population 
growth as a neutral or even a positive influence 
on development. 
They go on to argue that when an individual couple's 
childbearing decision imposes external costs on other 
families - through overexploitation of common 
resources, congestion of public services, or contribution 
to a socially undesirable distribution of income - there 
may also be a case to go beyond family planning to a 
system of incentives and taxes. However, the authors 
add that it is difficult to make a case for drastic financial 
or legal restrictions on childbearing since these would 
contradict the personal welfare goals family planning 
seeks to promote. 
This raises the question: Where do the needs of the 
society and the individual coincide, and where do they 
conflict? 
Resonses to questions about ideal family size in 
developing countries, especially in Africa, while lower 
than current fertility still imply much higher than desired 
fertility than in the case in the developed world, and 
higher than the levels needed to ensure the stabilization 
of human population growth within a century. 
Opponents of family planning programs suggest that 
women in developing countries want to have large 
families, and that it is their and their family's interests to 
do so~ This suggests that international agencies 
promoting modem contraception are guilty of cultural 
imperialism. 
Evidence of the desire to control fertility goes back as 
long as recorded history. Himes' classic History of 
Contraception tells of potions, advice and prayers used 
by all the world's cultures to delay or facilitate 
conception. Throughout the compendium runs a 
common thread: the desire to space and prevent 
pregnancies. The major reason for such teaching 
through the ages was not merely to facilitate casanovas 
in illicit relations, but to raise the awareness of the 
burdens uncontrolled childbearing placed on families, 
and the threat of repeated pregnancies to women's health 
and survival. 
Recent research tells us more about women's preferences 
for the timing and number of births. Researchers are 
sensitive to the notorious difficulty of eliciting feelings 
about 'ideal family size' on surveys, and have avoided 
questions which require women to imagine what they 
might have done if they enjoyed the privilege of 
controlling their fertility from marriage, if their 
community had possessed a well equiped clinic, and if 
their husbands and extended families were respectful of 
their preferences. Surveyers are left to ask about the 
current realities rather than the dreams of women. 
Nonetheless, the World Fertility Survey determined that 
in 23 of 28 countries studied, more than a quarter of 
women currently had given birth to more children than 
they would have preferred, and up to half the women 
aged 40-49 would have preferred to prevent their last 
birth. 
It has been estimated that women in developing 
countries would bear an average of 1.4 fewer children if 
they had the ability to choose. We can expect that this 
number would be even higher if women were not at the 
mercy of poverty and the pressures of patriarchal social 
structures. 
Kenya is a country with a high growth rate. In recent 
surveys, half of all married Kenyan women said they 
wanted no more children. Another 26 per cent said they 
would like to wait at least two years before having 
another child. Only 27 per cent of Kenya's married 
women practice birth control. In rough terms, three-
quarters of Kenyan women today indicate some desire 
to control their fertility, but only a third of these are able 
to do so. 
By using annual total population growth and ignoring 
evidence of unmet demand for birth control, many 
population control advocates argue that national 
governments should take steps to reduce fertility to 
levels lower than those preferred by their citizens. China 
is an obvious case where this is happening today, 
through the famous 'one-child per couple' policy. The 
Chinese government has mobilized a wide range of 
social forces and economic pressures, to force citizens to 
limit family sizes to one, or at most two children. 
However, surveys show that parents would prefer to 
have at least two or possibly three children, at least one 
of whom should be a son. Is the State justified in taking 
such actions to control individual preferences, even on 
the grounds of protecting group welfare in future? 
The Chinese government justifies its action on a number 
of grounds. These include assertions that high rates of 
population growth endanger an already crowded 
economy and environment, and that parental decisions to 
have large families compromise the welfare of future 
generations. Thus, the government calls for sacrifice by 
the current generation to guarantee the resources needed 
for billions yet unborn. Despite these ambitious 
pronouncements and strict authoritarian regulations, it is 
ironic that the Chinese family planning program is not 
regarded as providing a high quality service. There is 
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evidence of inadequate birth control education and 
supplies, and a very limited range of contraceptive 
options available to most women. In this case the State 
is playing an active role in population control, but 
provides inadequate services for family planning. 
To clarify this distinction between population control 
and family planning goals, it might help to look at the 
exact wording of reproductive rights adopted by the UN, 
which is: 'the right to decide freely and responsibly the 
number and spacing of one's children, and to have the 
information, education and means to do so'. 
While the Chinese government concentrates on the 
rights of the community to control fertility, the UN 
statements refer to the rights of individuals to make 
decisions. It is arguable that in most areas of the world, 
responsible individuals - and women in particular - do 
not enjoy the right to decide in the fullest sense. Women 
are not free and responsible if they are forced to have a 
large family because they fear the death of their children 
in infancy, any more than they could be considered free 
and responsible if they are directed to limit their fertility 
through compulsory use of specific methods of birth 
control. 
In much of the world children are the only means 
available to women to achieve status or security, and an 
absolute necessity if they need sons to satisfy their 
husband and extended family. Even without the 
intervention of the State, individuals often find their 
fertility preferences contradicted by the influences of 
other community members. Without the education and 
social options to provide alternatives to traditional 
institutions of patriarchy, women's choices can hardly be 
called free. 
One could also argue that those who have children 
without awareness and full consideration of the 
implications of their high fertility for the wider 
community are not acting responsibly. This is what the 
National Research Council refers to as 'external costs' 
which couples place on the community if their 
childbearing contributes to an overexploitation of 
resources. 
Similarly, those who must consider having a child in the 
context of inaccessible or inadequate health and family 
planning services are being denied their full rights. 
Under such conditions it is not sufficient to simply 
contrast individual choice and State intervention. The 
real question is how the State can best ensure that 
information and services are available to facilitate 
individuals in making free and responsible decisions on 
childbearing. The role of the State is not the setting of 
'rules' of reproduction, but the creation of an appropriate 
environment for responsible decision-making, and the 
provision of the means to implement those decisions 
freely and safely. 
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Recent research has been directed at examining why 
people who know about family planning and say they 
want it, do not use it. The answer is unsettling to many 
committed family planners. People were sceptical of the 
efficacy and safety of the methods provided by 
government birth control programs. In short, they 
wanted better quality services. In facing up to this issue 
investigators have been finding something that should be 
common sense: higher quality population and family 
planning services in developing countries lead to higher 
rates of use of contraceptives. A satisfied customer is a 
regular consumer, in family planning as in other areas of 
life. 
Quality programs can cost more in terms of better 
quality supplies, more variety, better trained staff and 
more systematic and caring follow-up. The word 'can' 
should be stressed here because many resources are 
consumed by population control efforts in the form of 
administrative mobilization of community pressures 
beyond basic educational needs, and the involvement of 
huge numbers of staff who have little to do with the 
provision of actual family planning services. Under 
some conditions, a commitment to quality and an 
abandonment of inefficient pressures and administrative 
sanctions might actually lead to less costly programs. 
Such programs would also have the advantage of 
building on the commitment and satisfaction of 
individuals, and would thus be more sustainable over the 
long run. 
A quality program - and we should specify that this 
means a voluntary approach providing a full range of 
contraceptive methods and related services - will in most 
settings require three innovations. 
1. It requires a reorientation to a 'client-centred' 
approach where the needs and desires of the 
woman or man take precedence. 
2. It requires mass education, as distinct from 
propaganda or sloganeering, in the full range of 
family planning options, rights and 
responsibilities. 
3. It requires increased investment in birth 
control supplies, primary service provision 
points, and networks of specialized services for 
referral and follow-up. 
Though it must be the responsibility of the community to 
defme and develop the strategy most appropriate to meet 
these three requirements, there is an obvious need for 
foreign donors to help most developing countries in 
addressing the problem. In most areas of the world the 
bulk of such aid would take the form of technical 
assistance to help with program development. 
Obviously for a long time there will be the need for 
supplies and equipment and perhaps even assistance in 
the 'printware' of pamphlets, guides, and reproductive 
education materials. 
Above all, 'quality' is a question of commitment. 
International agencies, governments and program staff 
need to respond to internationally recognised 
reproductive rights, and through this commitment 
become responsibile for providing high quality family 
planning services. This is the thrust of numerous UN 
conventions and conferences, and the mandate of the 
UNFPA, over the past two decades. 
For the past two decades the UN has promoted family 
planning as a key element of an international agenda 
dedicated to peace, development and human rights. The 
UN agencies have stressed the importance of individual 
awareness of the ongoing destruction of ecosystems and 
resources, and the dangerous combination of growing 
human populations and growing per capita consumption 
in this process. Family planning is promoted as the 
means to both enhance individual welfare and reduce 
population growth rates. For this to succeed it is 
necessary for all people everywhere to be guaranteed 
education, full family planning information and high-
quality, comprehensive contraceptive services. In this 
sense, family planning is a basic human, indeed a 
humane, right and responsibility which deserves our 
fullest support as a nation and our commitment as 
individuals. 
1 Valerie J Hull, Visitor, Child Survival Project, ANU. 
2Terence H Hull, Department of Political and Social 
Change, ANU. 
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